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NO INSTRUCTIONS REQUIRED:
DUE PROCESS AND POST-DEPRIVATION
REMEDIES FOR PROPERTY SEIZED IN
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
City of West Covina v. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. 678 (1999)
I. INTRODUCTION
In City of West Covina v. Perkins,' the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether the Due Process Clause 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires state or local law enforcement officers to
notify property owners of the state law remedies available for re-
covering property lawfully seized in criminal investigations.3
The Court ruled that the Due Process Clause does not require
officers to give property owners notice of the state law remedies
available to retrieve the seized property.
4
To arrive at this holding, Justice Kennedy, writing for a
seven-person majority, relied heavily on the fact that state law
remedies are well established by published and widely available
statutes and case law.5 The Court also noted the lack of support
for such a notice requirement in Supreme Court precedent and
federal and state criminal laws.6
This Note begins by examining the development of the
concept of "notice" as it pertains to the Due Process Clause.
This Note argues that Perkins correctly rejected the Ninth Cir-
cuit's expansive notice requirement because it is unwarranted
and unsupported by precedent. The Court properly concluded
'119 S. Ct. 678 (1999).
2 The Due Process Clause provides, in relevant part: "nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CoNST.
amend. XIV, § 1.






that law enforcement officers have no obligation under the Due
Process Clause to notify property owners of the procedures for
recovering their seized property. This Note further argues that
the Court's decision will not have a detrimental impact on fu-
ture judicial decisions regarding deprivation of property. Fi-
nally, this Note argues that the majority was erroneous in its
assertion, in dicta, that due process requires officers to give no-
tice that property has been seized pursuant to a search warrant.
This suggestion by the Court constitutes an unwarranted expan-
sion of due process principles into an area historically governed
by the Fourth Amendment.
II. BACKGROUND
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits states from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.",7 The concept of "Due
Process" encompasses rights not only to judicial procedures and
judicial remedies, but also to administrative procedures and to
judicial review of administrative decisions." The Supreme Court
recognizes rights to both procedural and substantive due proc-
9ess.
A. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Procedural due process is based on the theory that the pro-
tection against deprivation of life, liberty, and property is not
absolute, and that such deprivation is permissible when accom-
panied by procedural steps that ensure fairness. 10 To satisfy the
requirements of procedural due process, the state must provide
the injured party with notice and a meaningful opportunity to
be heard prior to depriving that party of life, liberty, or prop-
erty." In situations where pre-deprivation notice is impractical
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
' See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309 (1993).
See id. at 310.
"Todd G. Cosenza, Note, Preserving Procedural Due Process for Legal Immigrants Re-
ceiving Food Stamps in Light of the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
2065, 2069 (1997).
" Id. See also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950) ("An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any pro-
ceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
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or impossible, such as a search warrant or the necessity of quick
action by the state, the Supreme Court has found that the exis-
tence of post-deprivation remedies satisfies due process re-
quirements.1
2
There is no bright-line rule that governs the question of the
particular procedural protection that due process requires.3
The Supreme Court established a three-part balancing test in
Matthews v. Eldridg to determine entitlement to particular pro-
cedural safeguards. 5 Under Matthews, a court must consider:
(1) the private interest affected by the official action; (2) the
risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the pro-
cedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's in-
terest, including the function involved and the fiscal and admin-
istrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail. 6
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF NOTICE WITHIN THE
PROCEDURAL COMPONENT OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
The concept of notice is a fundamental element of the right
to procedural due process. 7 To meet the requirements of due
process, the notice must be "reasonable and adequate for the
purpose, [with due regard afforded] to the nature of the pro-
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections.").
" See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 531 (1984) (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527, 539 (1981)).
"See Fallon, supra note 8, at 331.
424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Matthews, the Supreme Court weighed a disability claim-
ant's interest in continued disability benefits, the fairness and reliability of existing
pre-termination procedures, the probable values of additional procedural safeguards,
and the burden of such additional safeguards, and concluded that due process does
not require an evidentiary hearing prior to the discontinuance of disability benefits.
Id. at 349.
25 See Fallon, supra note 8, at 330-31.
"Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. Substantive due process claims, by contrast, arise when
statutory or regulatory schemes, on their face, infringe on a personal constitutional
right. See Craig W. Hillwig, Comment, Giving Property all the Process That's Due: A Fun-
damental Misunderstanding About Due Process, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 703, 713-14 (1992).
The trial court in Perkins found that there was no substantive due process violation,
and the parties did not address the issue on appeal. See City of West Covina v. Per-
kins, 119 S. Ct. 678, 681 (1999).
" See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). See
also 16B AM.JuR. 2D Constitutional Law § 934 (1998).
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ceedings and the character of the rights which may be affected
by it."' s- To determine whether a particular method of notice is
reasonable for due process purposes, a Court must weigh the
state's interest against the interest of the individual seeking pro-
tection under the Fourteenth Amendment.' 9
1. The Purpose of the Notice Requirement
The primary purpose of the procedural due process notice
requirement is to ensure the "deprived person" a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.0 In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust,2' the Supreme Court held that notice by publication in a
newspaper to beneficiaries whose interests and addresses were
known regarding judicial settlement of accounts did not satisfy
the requirements of due process because there was no meaning-
ful opportunity to be heard. The Court reasoned that the
fundamental right to be heard "has little reality or worth unless
one is informed that the matter is pending, and can choose for
himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest., 23 In
the pre-deprivation context, the Court has developed and con-
sistently applied the Mullane standard, namely the requirement
S 16B AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 17, § 934.
"Id.
2 See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394
(1914)).
2 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
"See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319. In this case a NewYork statute permitting trust com-
panies to pool small trust estates into one common fund for administration purposes
also allowed the trust company to notify beneficiaries by publication in a local news-
paper of petitions for judicial settlement of the trust companies accounts. Id. at 308-
10. The Court found that notice by newspaper publication to beneficiaries whose
addresses were known did not satisfy due process, but such notice was satisfactory with
respect to beneficiaries whose addresses were unknown. Id. at 317-18. The Court
went on to clarify that personal service to individual beneficiaries is not required due
to the large number of interests and substantial similarities within large classes of in-
terests. Id. at 319. Rather, notice reasonably certain to reach most of the beneficiar-
ies interested in objecting would satisfy the notice requirement since any objections
sustained would inure to the benefit of all. Id. Although the court did not specify the
type of notice required, it stated that the notice must be reasonably calculated to in-
form the interested parties of the pending action and afford them an opportunity to
object. See id It is important to point out that this case addresses the notice re-
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of notice reasonably calculated to provide interested parties
with an opportunity to be heard.24
However, when meaningful pre-deprivation process is im-
practical or impossible,25 the Supreme Court has established a
major exception to the pre-deprivation procedural require-
ments of notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard by al-
lowing the existence of adequate post-deprivation remedies to
satisfy procedural due process.6 Under this exception, estab-
lished in Parratt v. Taylor27 the deprivation of property without
prior notice or hearing satisfies due process requirements if
adequate state law post-deprivation remedies are available.28 In
Parratt, a state prison inmate sued prison officials under 42
U.S.C. § 1983,2 alleging that the officials' negligent loss of his
mail-order hobby materials deprived him of his property with-
" See Hillwig, supra note 16, at 708. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-07 (1979); Memphis
Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 18 (1978).
' Situations where pre-deprivation process is impractical include seizures that (1)
are necessary to advance an important public interest; (2) present a special need for
prompt government action; and (3) utilize legitimate force over which the govern-
ment has strict control. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 (1972). In particu-
lar, the Court has allowed seizures without pre-deprivation process for search
warrants, for collecting the internal revenue of the United States, to meet the needs
of a national war effort, to protect against the economic disaster of a bank failure,
and to protect the public from misbranded drugs. See id. at 91-92 (citing cases in
which such seizures have been allowed). With respect to search warrants, the Court
stated:
[A] search warrant is generally issued to serve a highly important governmental need-
e.g., the apprehension and conviction of criminals .... Second, a search warrant is
generally issued in situations demanding prompt action. The danger is all too obvious that
a criminal will destroy or hide evidence or fruits of his crime if given any prior notice.
Third, the Fourth Amendment guarantees that the State will not issue search warrants
merely upon the conclusory application of a private party. It guarantees that the state will
not abdicate control over the issuance of warrants and that no warrant will be issued
without a prior showing of probable cause.
Id. at 93 n.30.
" See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540-41 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Da-
niels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (overruling Parratt's application of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 to negligent deprivations). See also Hillwig, supra note 16, at 704 (citing Parratt,
451 U.S. at 541).
-451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981).
' Id at 539. See also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 531 (1984).
Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action for "the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" by any person acting
"under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1999).
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
out due process of law.0 The Supreme Court held that al-
though the prisoner had been deprived of property under the
color of state law, he did not state a claim for relief under
§ 1983 because there was no violation of his due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.1 In deciding that the
prison officials did not violate the prisoner's due process rights,
the Supreme Court stated:
[E]ither the necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticality of
providing any meaningful pre-deprivation process, when coupled with
the availability of some meaningful means by which to assess the propri-
ety of the State's actions at some time after the initial taking, can satisfy
32the requirements of procedural due process.
The Court found that pre-deprivation process was impossi-
ble in this case because the loss of the prisoner's property was a
result of random and unauthorized acts by a state employee.3
In such a case, a state cannot predict precisely when the loss will
occur.34 The Court also found that the state tort claims act pro-
vided an adequate post-deprivation remedy, and thus satisfied
procedural due process.
Similarly, in Hudson v. Palmer,6 a prisoner alleged that dur-
ing the search of his cell, a prison guard deliberately destroyed
some of the prisoner's personal property, including legal mate-
rials and letters. The Court, applying the Parratt rule, held that
an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state
employee does not violate procedural due process when a
meaningful post-deprivation remedy exists.33 The Court rea-
soned that intentional conduct by a state employee can be as
' Parratt, 451 U.S. at 530. The prisoner was in solitary confinement at the time his
package arrived and was unable to collect it. Id. at 530. After being released from
solitary confinement, the prisoner contacted several prison officials regarding the
whereabouts of his packages, but the officials were unable to locate them or deter-






468 U.S. 517 (1984).
"Id. at 519-20.
Id. at 533. The Court accepted the lower courts' findings that state post-
deprivation remedies, such as judicial remedies under tort law, were available and
were adequate to compensate the prisoner for his property loss. Id. at 534-35.
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random and unauthorized as the negligent conduct discussed in
Parratt since the state cannot anticipate or control either action
in order to provide a practical pre-deprivation procedure. 9
However, in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,40 the Court reaf-
firmed its holding in Parratt, but held that post-deprivation
remedies do not satisfy due process where a deprivation of
property is caused by conduct pursuant to an established state
procedure, rather than random and unauthorized action.4 In
Logan, the Court considered whether the terms of an Illinois
employment discrimination statute deprived the petitioner of
an opportunity to pursue his employment discrimination
claim.2 The Court held that the petitioner was deprived of a
protected property interest in violation of the Due Process
Clause because the statute's 120-day limitation for convening a
fact fmdin hearing precluded the petitioner's opportunity for
a hearing. The Court distinguished Parratt on the ground that
it addressed random and unauthorized acts for which no pre-
deprivation process was practical, whereas in Logan, the state
system itself, by operation of law, would destroy a complainant's
property interest whenever the Commission fails to convene a
timely conference."
With respect to Perkins, the California Penal Code provides
two post-deprivation remedies for property seized pursuant to a
search warrant.45 Section 1536 states:
All property or things taken on a warrant must be retained by the
officer in his custody, subject to the order of the court to which he is re-
quired to return the proceedings before him, or of any other court in
Id. at 533.
"455 U.S. 422 (1982).
Id. at 436.
"Id at 424-25. The Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/2-102 (West 1993), allows claimants to bring allegations of employment discrimina-
tion before the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission within 180 days of the
occurrence of the discriminatory act. See Logan, 455 U.S. at 424. The statute also
gives the Commission 120 days within which to convene a fact finding conference. See
id. The Commission's representative scheduled the conference five days after the ex-
piration of the statutory period expired. Ad. at 426.
" Logan, 455 U.S. at 434 ("[T]he State may not finally destroy a property interest
without first giving the putative owner an opportunity to present his claim of entitle-
ment.").
41 Id. at 436.
See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1536,1540 (West 1999).
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which the offense respect to which the property or things taken is tri-able."
Section 1540 of the California Penal Code states:
If it appears that the property taken is not the same as that de-
scribed in the warrant, or that there is no probable cause for believing
the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued, the magis-
trate must cause it to be restored to the person from whom it was
taken.
4 7
Both remedies require the property owner to file a motion
with the court.48
2. Statutory Notice
The principle that a well-established and publicly available
statute is sufficient notice of the information contained in that
statute is well established in Supreme Court jurisprudence.49
The Supreme Court introduced this principle in Reetz v. Michi-
gan50 when it held that a statute fixing the time and place of
meetings of a medical licensing board provided applicants with
sufficient notice of the procedure for obtaining a hearing re-
garding their applications. 1 The Court emphasized that no
special notice of the time and location of the meeting was nec-
essary because the statute itself was sufficient notice.2
This principle of statutory notice became firmly established
in North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman,5 3 where the Court held
that all persons are presumptively charged with knowledge of
the provisions of statutes, and must take note of the procedures
adopted by them.54 The Supreme Court further developed the
general rule of statutory notice in Texaco, Inc. v. Short5 in which
it stated that a person is charged with knowledge of the statutory
'6Id. § 1536.
4 Id. § 1540.
See City of West Covina v. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. 678, 681 (1999).
" See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 533 (1982); North Laramie Land Co.
v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 509 (1903).
188 U.S. 505 (1903).
5Id at 509.
268 U.S. 276 (1925).
Id. at 283.
454 U.S. 516 (1982).
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provisions that affect his substantive rights.56 In Texaco, a state
statute provided that an interest in minerals that is separate
from the ownership of the surface property automatically re-
verts to the surface owner if the interest is not exploited by the
mineral owner for 20 years and the mineral owner fails to file a
statement of claim in the local county recorder's office. The
statute did not require notice prior to the lapse, but it con-
tained a provision stating that the surface owner who succeeded
to the ownership may give notice that the mineral interest had
lapsed.58  The mineral owners, who had failed to utilize the
claim procedure and lost their rights to the minerals, claimed
that the statute violated their due process rights because the
state failed to notify them of the legal requirements of the new
statute.59 The Supreme Court rejected their argument, and held
that it is well established that persons owning property within a
state are charged with knowledge of the relevant statutoryprovi-
sions affecting the control or disposition of such property.
In Atkins v. Parker,6' the Court once again focused on indi-
viduals' responsibility to educate themselves about the law.62
The majority in Atkins held that a notice describing the effect.of
a change in the Food Stamp Act in general terms, without spe-
cific indications of the impact of the change on the individual
recipients, was sufficient under the Due Process Clause.3 The
Court, restating the principle that all citizens are presumptively
charged with knowledge of the law, noted that the recipients
had adequate opportunity following the statutoiz amendment
to become familiar with their obligations under it.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The respondents Lawrence and Clara Perkins rented a












Marsh.65 Marsh became a suspect in a murder investigation af-
ter moving out of the Perkins' home.66 However, the Perkins
home was Marsh's last known address, and it thus became the
subject of a police search. 7 The West Covina police obtained a
search warrant for the respondents' home on May 20, 1993, and
performed the search the next day while the respondents were
away.! The warrant authorized a search of "all rooms, attics,
basements, garages, and other parts therein."69  Since the offi-
cers did not know which room had belonged to Marsh, they
searched the entire house.70  The officers seized photos of
Marsh, paperwork belonging to Marsh, an address book belong-
ing to Lawrence Perkins, a shotgun registered to Lawrence Per-
kins, a starter pistol, and $2,469 in cash.
After completing the search, the officers left a form at the
respondents' home entitled "Search Warrant: Notice of Serv-
ice. 72 The notice informed the respondents that their home
had been searched, identified the searching agency (West
Covina Police), and provided the name of the court and judge
that issued the warrant, the date of the search, a phone number
to contact the searching officers, and a list of the property
seized.7s
On the day of the search, Perkins contacted one of the de-
tectives who had taken part in the search, and he informed Per-





Perkins v. City of West Covina, 113 F.3d 1004, 1006 (9th Cir. 1997).
70 Id.
" Respondent's Brief at 2-3, Perkins (No. 97-1230).
' Petitioner's Brief at 7-8, Perkins (No. 97-1230).
' Id at 8. The notice of service did not provide the search warrant number be-
cause the warrant was under seal due to its connection to an ongoing murder investi-
gation. Id at 7-8. Detectives Melnyk, Ferrari, and Nalian, and Lieutenant Shimanski
conducted the search. Perkins, 113 F.3d at 1006. Judge Oki issued the search war-
rant. Id. at 1007. The inventory of the property seized was left pursuant to Section
1535 of the California Penal Code which provides:
When an officer takes property under a warrant, he must give a receipt for the prop-
erty taken (specifying it in detail) to the person from whom it was taken by him, or in
whose possession it was found; or in the absence of any person, he must leave it in the
place where he found the property.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1535 (West 1999).
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kins that he would need to obtain a court order for the release
of his property.74 One month after the search, Perkins at-
tempted to obtain a court order by contactingJudge Oki, but he
was informed that Judge Oki was on vacation. Perkins was un-
able to get another judge to release his property by providing
his name because the property was filed under Marsh's name.
Court house personnel informed Perkins that he needed the
search warrant number, the case number, or other identifying
information to get a judicial hearing.77 The search warrant
number had not been provided to Perkins because the warrant
had been sealed, and there was no case number because no case
had been filed.78
Unable to obtain the relevant information, and unaware
that search warrants were listed in the court clerk's documents
by the address of the searched residence in addition to the
search warrant number, Perkins abandoned his attempt to ob-
tain a court order releasing his property.7 Even after Perkins
retained counsel, neither he nor his attorney made any further
attempts to obtain a court order for the release of the seized
property.' On November 19, 1993, Perkins filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California
against the City of West Covina ("the City") and the searching
officers."'
The Perkins' complaint alleged that the officers violated
their Fourth Amendment 2 lights by searching their home with-
out probable cause and exceeding the scope of the warrant.
8 3
The Perkins' further alleged that the City had a policy of per-
mitting unlawful searches.84 Both sides filed motions for sum-
"Petitioner's Brief at 8, Perkins (No. 97-1230).
75Id,
76 &r
"Respondent's Brief at 5, Perkins (No. 97-1230).
"Id. at6.
"Petitioner's Brief at 8-9, Perkins (No. 97-1230).
Id. at 9.
"See Perkins v. City of West Covina, 113 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 1997).
"The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.




mary judgment, and the district court invited the parties to file
supplemental briefs regarding whether the state-law remedies
for the return of seized property sufficiently satisfied due proc-
ess.85 The district court granted summary judgment for all de-
fendants without ruling on whether the remedies for the
recovery of seized property violated due process.6
The respondents appealed their Fourth Amendment claims
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, but
the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to clar-
ify and resolve the due process issue. 7 On remand, the district
court granted summary judgment for the City, holding that the
respondents waived any claim concerning the adequacy of the
post deprivation remedies provided by the California Penal
Code because they made no good faith attempt to invoke the
appropriate remedy.8 California law allows property owners to
retrieve their seized property by filing a motion under either
Section 1536 or Section 1540 of the California Penal Code. 9
The court further held that the respondents received adequate
"notice" of the remedy:
[Perkins] was told that he had to [obtain an] order to get his property
back, he was told what court and what judge to go to, and he was given
the date of the warrant and of the search. [Therefore,] the City's failure
to give Perkins formal notice of the procedure did not render that pro-




On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, reversed the
decision of the district court, directing it to enter summary
judgment in favor of the respondents.9  The court of appeals
" Id at 4.
"Id.
See id.
See id. at 4-5. The district court reasoned that the waiver rule applied because:
The evidence shows at most that the plaintiff [Lawrence Perkins] made one trip to
the Municipal Court, was advised that there was no file in his name and thereafter ceased
any efforts to obtain an order returning his property. He filed nothing, he made no in-
quiry about the procedures ....
Id. at 5.
"See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. Section 1536 is the appropriate
remedy for this case. See Petitioner's Brief at 4-5, Perkins (No. 97-1230).
" See Petitioner's Brief at 5, Perkins (No. 97-1230).
" Perkins v. City of West Covina, 113 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 1997).
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determined that under well established legal precedent, there
was no requirement of a prior hearing before the seizure of pos-
sessions under a search warrant.92 The court of appeals also
found that the California Penal Code provides adequate post-
deprivation remedies, thus satisfying the requirements of due
process.9 However, the court of appeals relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Memphis Ligh? to arrive at its conclusion
that the City must provide property owners with detailed notice
of the post-deprivation remedies for the return of seized prop-
erty, as well as the necessary information to invoke those proce-
dures. 5 The Ninth Circuit stated that the notice provided to
Perkins was insufficient because it did not include: information
on the procedure for contesting seizure or retention of the
property taken, information for initiating the procedure in the
appropriate court, a means of identifying the court file, and an
explanation of the need for a written motion to the court stat-
ing why the property should be returned.9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari9 7 on May 4, 1998 to
decide whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires a State or its local authorities to give de-
tailed and specific instructions or advice to property owners who
seek return of property lawfully seized but no longer needed for
police investigation or criminal prosecution.98
' Id. at 1010-11 (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981) and Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93-94 n.30 (1972)).
" Id. at 1011. In situations involving property seizure that require prompt action
by the State, such as seizures for criminal investigations, "the availability of some
meaningful means by which to assess the propriety of the State's action at some time
after the initial taking... satisf[ies] the requirements of procedural due process." Id.
(quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981)).
436 U.S. 1 (1978).
Perkins, 113 F.3d at 1012.
Id. at 1013. The "notice of service" under California Law includes information
pertaining to the performance of the search, the search date, the searching agency,
the date of the warrant, the issuingjudge, the court in which he or she serves, and the
persons to be contacted for further information. Id. at 1013.
" City of West Covina v. Perkins, 118 S. Ct. 1690 (1998).
"City of West Covina v. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. 678, 679 (1999).
20001 1025
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IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. THE MAJOR=TY OPINION
Writing for the majority,99 Justice Kennedy reversed the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision and held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require
police officers to provide property owners with notice of state
law remedies for the return of lawfully seized property.' °° The
Court also rejected the respondents' alternative argument that
the notice of service provided to the respondents was inade-
quate because it did not contain a search warrant number.' °'
The Court began by observing that the purpose of the no-
tice requirement under the Due Process Clause is to ensure that
property owners have a meaningful opportunity to be heard.' 2
To satisfy due process, the Court found that officers who seize
property pursuant to a search warrant must provide notice that
the property has been seized in order to allow the owner to pur-
sue the available remedies.03 According to the Court, however,
this notice requirement does not include notifying property
owners of the available state law remedies.'"
In rejecting the respondents' claim, the Court first reasoned
that the Due Process Clause does not require notification of
state post-deprivation remedies when those remedies are well-
established by publicly available state statutes and case law.' 5
The Court found that after the initial notification of the seizure,
the property owner is responsible for utilizing public sources to
ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyerjoined in the opinion. Justices Thomas and Scalia concurred in the judgment
in a separate concurring opinion written by Justice Thomas.
"0 Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 681. The respondents did not appeal the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion that California law provides adequate remedies for the return of seized
property, and therefore the Court did not address this issue. See id
,Id. at 683. The Court relied on the district court's finding that the respondents
could not establish the need for the search warrant number to file a motion for the
return of their property. Id.




' & at 681-82.
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discover the procedures for retrieving his property.'6 To justify
its position on statutory notice, the majority cited the Court's
earlier decision in Reetz v. Michigan,0 7 which stated that a statute
specifying the time and place of medical licensing board meet-
ings provided license applicants with sufficient notice of the
procedures for obtaining a hearing. 8 The Court emphasized
that the statute itself is sufficient notice, and thus no special no-
tice to the particular individual is required.'09
To further support the position that statutory notice of the
available state law remedies is sufficient, the majority referred to
Atkins v. Parker."0 In Atkins, the Court held that a notice describ-
ing the effect of a change in the Food Stamp Act in general
terms, without specific indications of the impact of the change
on the individual recipients, was sufficient under the Due Proc-
ess Clause."' The majority highlighted the principle stated in
Atkins that "[t]he entire structure of our democratic govern-
ment rests on the premise that the individual citizen is capable
of informing himself about the particular policies that affect his
destiny."
' 2
Next, the Court reviewed prior Supreme Court cases in
which state post-deprivation remedies were deemed sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of due process. "' Justice Kennedy
noted that in cases where the laws establishing the remedies
were public and available, the Court has not required states to
provide property owners with information about the procedures
to retrieve their property.114
Justice Kennedy rejected the Ninth Circuit's interpretation
of Memphis Light"5 as requiring officers to give the respondents
' Id. ("Once the property owner is informed that his property has been seized, he
can turn to these public sources to learn about the remedial procedures available to
him. The City need not take other steps to inform him of his options.").
188 U.S. 505 (1903). See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text (discussing
Reetz).
,,Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 682.
MId (quoting Reetz, 188 U.S. at 509).
"° 472 U.S. 115 (1985).
Id. at 131.
' Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 682 (quoting Atkins, 472 U.S. at 131).
1&Id.
.' Id. (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 486 U.S. 517 (1984)). See also supra notes 36-39
and accompanying text.
" 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
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notice of California's post-deprivation procedures. 116 In Memphis
Light, the Court held that due process required a public utility
to inform its customers of the procedures for resolving account-
ing disputes.'1 7 Justice Kennedy distinguished the holding in
Memphis Light on the ground that the procedures required to be
disclosed in that case were arcane because they were not de-
scribed in any publicly available document and depended
largely on word of mouth referral." On the other hand, the
state law remedies applicable in Perkins were available to the
public."9 After refusing to apply the holding in Memphis Light
to cases involving published and well-established state law
remedies, the majority reiterated its position that there is no
general rule that due process requires notice of post-deprivation
remedies and procedures. 20
Finally, the Court reasoned that requiring notification of
remedies would conflict with long existing and well-established
Federal and State criminal law procedures, 2 ' and would render
the notice required by these statutes inadequate under the Con-
stitution. Justice Kennedy discussed Rule 41 (d) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure which requires federal agents seiz-
ing property under a warrant to give the property owners a copy
of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken.2 Justice
Kennedy noted that neither the federal nor state rules require
that notice of post-deprivation procedures be provided to prop-
erty owners.194
B. JUSTICE THOMAS' CONCURRENCE
Justice Thomas agreed with the majority that the Due Proc-
ess Clause does not require the City to provide the respondents
with notice of the state-law post-deprivation remedies.2a How-
"
6 Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 682.





" Id. at 683 (citing federal and state laws governing execution of search warrants
and procedures for return of seized property).
" Id at 682.
FED. R CRlM. P. 41(d). This rule has an analogous counterpart in state statutes.
See Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 683.
32 Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 682.
" Id at 684 (Thomas, J., concurring).
1028 [Vol. 90
CITY OF WEST COVINA v. PERKINS
ever, Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurring opinion 126 to
argue that the requirement for police officers to leave a Notice
of Seizure 127 may be more properly governed by the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable searches and sei-
zures" rather than the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 8 Justice Thomas argued that the majority's con-
clusion that due process governs the search and seizure notice
requirement2 is "an unwarranted extension of procedural due
process principles developed in civil cases into an area of law
that has heretofore been governed exclusively by the Fourth
Amendment."''
In support of this view, Justice Thomas cited Gerstein v.
Pugh83 for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment is spe-
cifically tailored for the criminal justice system, and its balance
between individual and public interests determines "due proc-
ess" for seizures in criminal cases. 3 2 Justice Thomas also dis-
cussed historical evidence which suggests that the common-law
procedure for executing a search warrant-the model for a
"reasonable" search under the Fourth Amendment-required
officers to provide an inventory of the property seized. 33 Justice
Thomas concluded that the majority improperly relied on the
Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for the notice of seizure
requirement in criminal cases, and suggested that the Fourth
Amendment is better suited to govern this notice require-
ment.134
"'Justice ScaliajoinedJustice Thomas in his concurring opinion.
'" This Notice informs the property owners of the property that was seized. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 41(d).
- Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 684 (ThomasJ, concurring).
" The majority stated in dicta, "when law enforcement agents seize property pur-
suant to warrant, due process requires them to take reasonable steps to give notice
that the property has been taken so the owner can pursue available remedies for its
return." Id. at 681.
" Id. at 684 (Thomas, J., concurring).
.' 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
" Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 684 (ThomasJ, concurring) (quoting Gerstein, 420 U.S. at
125, n.27).
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 116, n.17; TELFORD
TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 82 (1969)).




This Note argues that the Court properly rejected the ex-
pansive notice requirement imposed by the Ninth Circuit be-
cause it was unwarranted and completely unsupported by
precedent. The Court correctly concluded that law enforce-
ment officers have no obligation under the Due Process Clause
to notify property owners of the procedures for seeking the re-
turn of their seized property. This Note also argues that the
Court's decision will not have a detrimental impact on future
judicial decisions regarding deprivation of property.
However, this Note contends that the majority was incorrect
in its assertion, in dicta, that the Due Process Clause governs the
execution of a criminal search warrant, and thus requires offi-
cers to give notice that property has been seized. This sugges-
tion by the Court represents an unwarranted and careless
expansion of due process principles into an area historically
governed by the Fourth Amendment.
A. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE DOES NOT REQUIRE LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS TO NOTIFY PROPERTY OWNERS OF POST-
DEPRIVATION REMEDIES FOR THE RETURN OF SEIZED PROPERTY.
The majority properly concluded that due process does not
require police officers to provide property owners with notice of
state law post-deprivation remedies when their property has
been seized in a criminal investigation.1" The strongest argu-
ments in support of this holding are the statutory notice rule
and the absence of a remedy notification requirement in Su-
116
preme Court cases involving post-deprivation issues.
1. Statutory Notice is Sufficient For Published and Well-Established Statutes
The statutory notice rule established in Supreme Court
precedent 137 and relied upon by Justice Kennedy indicates that
police officers have no duty to notify property owners of avail-
able post-deprivation remedies.'- According to the rule, all citi-
" See id. at 682.
1 See id. at 681-82.
See, e.g., Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 131 (1985); Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454
U.S. 516, 533 (1982); North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925);
Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 509 (1903).
"' See Atkins, 472 U.S. at 130-31 (stating that all citizens are presumptively charged
with knowledge of the law, especially when the law is well-established).
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zens are presumed to know the law.139 Therefore, information
that is well established and publicly available, such as the statu-
tory remedies at issue in this case, need not be directly provided
to property owners by police officers. "' °
The basic premise underlying this rule, highlighted in At-
kins and Texaco is that individuals are responsible for and capa-
ble of educating themselves about the public laws and policies
that affect their lives or property.4 1 This rationale is especially
true when the property owner already has notice that the prop-
erty has been seized, and can reasonably acquire information
regarding the steps necessary to retrieve his property.
4 2
Under the statutory notice rule the Perkins family is pre-
sumed to know the available state post-deprivation remedies.4
First, the searching officers left a Notice of Seizure at the Per-
kins' home which stated that the property had been searched,
and provided the name of the issuing judge, the respective
court house, the date of the search, the name of the searching
agency, a number to contact for further information, and an in-
ventory of the property seized. 4  Second, the post-deprivation
remedies were codified in the California Penal Code, which is
published and generally available at libraries. 5
Once the Perkins family learned that its property had been
seized, it had a duty to apprise itself of the publicly available
remedies for retrieving the seized property.' The first step
would be to contact one of the searching officers at the number
"I See Texaco, 454 U.S. at 533. See also North Laramie, 268 U.S. at 283.
11 See Texaco, 454 U.S. at 533.
"' Atkins, 472 U.S. at 131 ("[T]he entire structure of our democratic government
rests on the premise that the individual citizen is capable of informing himself about
the particular policies that affect his destiny."); Texaco, 454 U.S. at 532 ("It is well es-
tablished that persons owning property within a state are charged with knowledge of
relevant statutory provisions affecting the control or disposition of such property.").
" Cf id. (discussing a notice describing the effect of an amendment to the Food
Stamp Act in general terms, and stating "[s]urely Congress can presume that such a
notice relative to a matter as important as a change in a household's food stamp al-
lotment would prompt an appropriate inquiry if it is not fully understood").
See e.g., Texaco, 454 U.S. at 533.
' See Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 679-80.
'' The available post-deprivation remedies are stated in CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1536
and 1540 (West 1999). See supra notes 46-47 for the text of the statutory provisions.
'" See Atkins, 472 U.S. at 131.
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provided on the notice of seizure.7 The Perkins family pursued
this option, and one of the searching officers informed Mr. Per-
kins that he would need a court order to retrieve his property."8
The next logical step would be to go to the courthouse to in-
quire about obtaining a court order.1'4 The statutes governing
the available remedies are a matter of public record, and the
Perkins could have sought the necessary information from the
court clerk or he could have obtained professional legal ad-
vice.'- Mr. Perkins attempted to obtain a court order, but be-
came frustrated and abandoned his attempt when he was
unable to locate his file in the court records because he lacked
the search warrant number.15'
Mr. Perkins' actions after the execution of the search shows
that he was able to obtain in reasonable time the basic informa-
tion regarding the retrieval of his property, namely the need for
a court order.5 2 This procedure is not a secret, but rather a
publicly available remedy.5 3 Mr. Perkins' impatience with the
court system does not justify requiring police officers to give no-
tice of established and publicly available post-deprivation reme-
dies. 54 Any imposition by the appellate court of a duty on the
part of police officers to notify property owners of post-
deprivation remedies contravenes the statutory notice rule and
"' See Petitioner's Brief at 8, Perkins (No. 97-1230). The notice of seizure left at the
Perkins' home stated: "If you wish further information you may contact Det. Ferrari




" See id at 8-9. The relevant information was also listed in the court records by the
address of the searched home. Id. at 8. The Supreme Court adopted the District
Court's finding that Perkins failed to establish that he needed the search warrant
number to obtain a court order for the return of his property. See Perkins, 119 S. CL
at 683.
... See Perkins, 119 S. CL at 680 ("Not long after the search, Perkins called Ferrari,
one of the detectives listed on the Notice, and inquired about return of the seized
property. One of the detectives told Perkins he needed to obtain a court order
authorizing the property's return.").
"' The California Penal Code is a public statute. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1536 (West
1999).
"' See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 131 (emphasizing the importance of one's
personal duty to inform himself of policies or laws that affect his life).
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is unwarranted by the Due Process Clause. 55 Thus, the Supreme
Court properly reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that the
Due Process Clause does not require officers to give property
owners notice of state law remedies.
2. The Availability of Post-Deprivation Remedies Satisfies
Due Process Requirements and Precludes the Need for Further Notice
The justifications for requiring notice in the pre-deprivation
context do not apply in the post-deprivation context. 5 In Par-
ratt v. Taylor,'57 the Supreme Court created an exception to the
pre-deprivation notice and hearing requirement, whereby the
availability of post-deprivation remedies satisfies the require-
ments of procedural due process when quick action by the state
is necessary or when providing pre-deprivation process is im-
practical.5 8
Applying this exception and the underlying rationale to the
Perkins' claim warrants the conclusion that due process does
not require notice of California's post-deprivation remedies.59
First, the pending criminal investigation and subsequent search
warrant demanded quick action by the state. 1' Furthermore,
the circumstances surrounding search warrants in general
would render impractical any attempts to comply with the pre-
deprivation procedural requirements of notice and hearing.'6 '
Thus, the availability of state post-deprivation remedies under
California law sufficiently satisfies procedural due process re-
162quirements.
' See generally Atkins, 427 U.S. at 131; Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 533
(1982); North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925); Reetz v.
Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 509 (1903).
' See Hillwig, supra note 16, at 704 (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539
(1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)).
" 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
" Id. at 539. See also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532-33 (1984) (applying the
Parratt rule to hold that due process is satisfied when a meaningful post-deprivation
remedy is available).
" See Hillwig, supra note 16, at 736-37 (stating that "Parratt recognizes that under
certain circumstances pre-deprivation process is impractical" and that in such circum-
stances "[a] state can provide due process by affording an adequate post-deprivation
remedy for ... deprivations of property").
" SeeFuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93-94 n.30 (1972).
161 Id
,,SeeHudson, 468 U.S. at 539. (citing Parratt, 451 U.S. at 537-44).
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In addition to the existence of the post-deprivation excep-
tion, prior Supreme Court cases that have applied the exception
do not require police officers to further provide notice to the
property owners about the post-deprivation remedies or proce-
dures for invoking them. 163 In these cases, there is absolutely
no mention of a requirement to notify property owners of the
available remedies.
Furthermore, Memphis Light,'6 the case in which the Su-
preme Court held that a public utility had an obligation under
the Due Process Clause to inform a customer whose service was
on the verge of termination of the administrative procedures to
resolve an accounting dispute, is distinguishable on two
grounds.'6 First, the procedures in that case were not publicly
available, and thus a person informed of the impending termi-
nation of his utility service could not reasonably be expected to
know of the procedures available to object to the termination. 67
Second, the issues in Memphis Light were in the pre-deprivation
context where, according to the Mullane framework, sufficient
notice must be "reasonably calculated... to apprise [the] inter-
ested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections."'6' In that context,
knowledge of the remedies is essential to obtaining a meaning-
ful hearing, and thus the notice must provide information per-
taining to the remedies . 69
The facts surrounding Perkin '7 are substantially different
from those in Memphis Light because the remedies in Perkins are
publicly available and the existence of a search warrant places
Se4 e.g., id. at 532-35; Parrat, 451 U.S. at 538-40.
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 532-35; Parrat, 451 U.S. at 538-40.
Memphis Light, Gas, & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
' See generally adL at 13.
"'See id. at 13-15.
'" See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
10 See Memphis Light 436 U.S. at 14-15. The Court stated:
Petitioner's notification procedure, while adequate to apprise the [respondents] of the
threat of termination of service, was not "reasonably calculated" to inform them of the
availability of "an opportunity to present their objections" to their bills.... Notice in a
case of this kind does not comport with constitutional requirements when it does not ad-
vise the customer of the availability of a procedure for protesting a proposed termination
of utility service as unjustified.
Id. at 14-15.
"' City of West Covina v. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. 678, 682 (1999).
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the case in the post-deprivation context. 7 ' Therefore, Memphis
Light does not apply to the circumstances present in Perkins, and
consequently Supreme Court precedent does not support a no-
tice requirement for post-deprivation remedies, particularly
where the statutes embodying the remedies are publicly avail-
able.172
The Court did not address any substantive due process is-
sues in Perkins.73 The District Court rejected the Perkins' claim
that the City had a policy of permitting unlawful searches, and
the family did not raise this issue on appeal.7  Moreover, cases
involving substantive due process claims in the property depri-
vation context usually target city-wide policies that result in un-
fair deprivations of property.' 75
The Court's decision in Perkins will not have any detrimental
effect on due process rights in the post-deprivation context if it
is limited to situations in which the available state law remedies
are published and generally available. 76 Although the opinion
seems to simplify the ease with which people can obtain infor-
mation regarding the statutory remedies, the due process clause
does not guarantee a right to simple procedures.
Furthermore, under the Matthews test, v8 requiring law en-
forcement agents to give detailed notice of post deprivation
procedures would be financially and administratively burden-
some on law enforcement organizations across the country.79
See id.
,f See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532-33 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527, 538-40 (1981). But cf. Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 14.
.,. See Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 679.
" See id. at 680-81.
"See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436 (1982) (holding that post-
deprivation remedies don't satisfy due process where the deprivation is caused by
conduct pursuant to established state procedure). See also Hillwig, supra note 16, at
714.
",6 Cf Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 13 (providing the controlling law for cases in
which the remedies are not publicly available).
'" Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 535 (1984) (rejecting the plaintiff's argument
that state law remedies should be deemed inadequate because they were far from cer-
tain and complete).
',' See Hillwig, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
"' See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (stating that one of the factors to be
considered in determining entitlement to procedural safeguards is the government's
interest, "including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail"). Detailed no-
tice would require a complete revamp of current procedures for executing search
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Chief Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit described the Mat-
thews test as a "cost-benefit approach.., which asks essentially
whether the particular procedural safeguard that the plaintiff is
urging would save more in costs of legal error than it would add
in administrative or other costs."'80 Under this approach, a de-
tailed notice requirement would add more in administrative
costs and burdens than it would save in legal error, and it would
also expose the government to tremendous due process liabili-
ties in the event that the notice fails to mention or does not
adequately explain one of the available post-deprivation reme-
dies. ' Additionally, it forces law enforcement and state gov-
ernment personnel to become legal advisors.' Since the
officers provided the Perkins with sufficient information regard-
ing the details of the search, and California law provides ade-
quate post-deprivation remedies, due process was served. 3
B. IMPACT ON FUTURE JUDICIAL DECISIONS INVOLVING PROPERTY
DEPRIVATION
The holding in Perkins that the Due Process Clause does not
require officers to notify property owners of available state law
remedies to retrieve seized property will not have a detrimental
effect on future due process cases involving deprivation of
property. Two recent property deprivation cases citing Perkins
warrants and substantial changes to the notice of seizure forms currently in place. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (d) (requiring only that agents leave at the premises a copy of the
search warrant and a list of the property taken). The state laws governing the execu-
tion of search warrants are similar to the federal law. See, e.g., Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at
683.
'Tavarez v. O'Malley, 826 F.2d 671,676 (7th Cir. 1987).
See Tony Mauro, An Unlikely High Court Specialis LEGALTIMES, Nov. 2, 1998, at 8
("[The] Ninth Circuit ruling, if upheld, could bring due process nightmares to gov-
ernments in certain kinds of property seizure cases.").
" See id ("Governments fear they would virtually have to provide legal advice to
citizens on how to recover property if the Ninth Circuit's ruling is not overturned.").
'" See generally Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (finding that the necessity of
quick action by the state coupled with the availability of adequate post-deprivation
procedures satisfies procedural due process).
.. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13 (1978) (requir-
ing notice when statutes are arcane or not publicly available); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (supporting the proposition
that in the pre-deprivation context, due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard prior to any deprivation).
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for various propositions have limited its scope to due process
claims in the post-deprivation context.
In Gete v. Immigration and Naturalization Services,1 16 the court
held on remand from the Ninth Circuit that due process re-
quired the Immigration and Naturalization Services ("INS") (1)
to provide notice of the factual and legal bases for a forfeiture
to car owners upon seizure of vehicles; (2) to permit access to
any adverse evidence that it intends to rely on at the personal
interview or any subsequent hearing; and (3) to provide written
rulings and explanations in those rulings of the evidence it re-
lied on and the factors it considered in reaching its decision. 87
The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' due process claim was
substantial, and that due process requires certain of the proce-
dures requested by them.r88 On remand, the INS asserted that
the Ninth Circuit's analysis was not controlling in light of the
Supreme Court's intervening opinion in Perkins, and that the
"' See Gete v. Immigration and Naturalization Servs., No. C94-8812, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11806 (W.D. Wash. July 21, 1999); McKenzie v. City of Chicago, No. 97C-284,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9084 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 1999).
No. C94-8812, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11806 (W.D. Wash.July 21, 1999).
Id. at *17. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for a determination of the
plaintiffs' motions for class certification and for preliminary injunctive relief. Id. at
*1. The district court granted both the class certification and a preliminary injunc-
tion requiring the INS to provide certain notices in future seizures. Id. at *17. The
named plaintiffs in the class action were ten persons whose cars were seized by INS
after they entered the United States from Canada based on alleged violations of 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a)-(b), which assigns criminal liability for bringing illegal aliens into
the United States, and allows border officials to seize vehicles used for such actions.
Id. This case addressed the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment because the
plaintiffs sued an arm of the federal government. See id at *10. The Fifth Amend-
ment provides in pertinent part: "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"' Gete, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11806, at *11. The Ninth Circuit further stated:
[R]equiring the disclosure of the factual bases for seizures would go a long way toward
preventing some of the erroneous and fundamentally unfair forfeiture decisions that inevi-
tably flow from so haphazard a process. So, too, would requiring the giving of notice of the
specific statutory provision allegedly violated, rather than allowing the mere provision,
without explanation, of copies of the entire statute and regulations. Similarly, furnishing
owners with copies of evidence to be used against them, such as officers' reports detailing
the facts upon which the claim of probable cause is based, would permit them to under-
stand the true nature of the INS' charges and afford them a fair opportunity to prepare a
proper defense to the threatened forfeiture.
I&. at *11-*12.
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plaintiffs were therefore entitled to no relief on their claim re-
lating to the adequacy of notice.18 9
The district court distinguished Perkins on the ground that
it dealt with whether officers must provide notice of post-
deprivation remedies, rather than with the adequacy of the no-
tice of seizure itself.19 The court stated:
Perkins is inapplicable because the plaintiffs here challenge the ade-
quacy of the seizure notice as to the bases for the seizure, the lawfulness
of the seizure, and the constitutionality of the regulations providing for
seizure. The Court in Perkins did not address, nor decide, what notice
must be given at the point of seizure regarding the bases of the seizure
or [the constitutionality of] the remedies provided ....191
This distinction demonstrates that courts must analyze the
adequacy of statutory notice on a case by case basis to determine
whether due process has been satisfied:
[n]otice of the bases for the seizure, or of the reasons for not returning
seized property, serves a different purpose than notice of available
remedies to return lawfully seized property. Notice in the former in-
stance helps ensure that a meaningful hearing is held on the vital matter
of whether the seizure was lawful. The administrative hearings chal-
lenged by the plaintiffs are intended to allow the plaintiffs to secure a re-
turn of their property if they make a showing of lawfulness. They are not
routine hearings like those addressed in Perkins, held simply to force a
ministerial act, i.e., a return of lawfully seized property that the state no
longer has an interest in retaining.
Thus, Perkins has not been interpreted to provide blanket
authority for the statutory notice rule in property deprivation
193cases.
"'Id. at *13.
Id. at *14. In Perkins, the Court stated:
[The plaintiffs] raise no independent challenge to the Court of Appeals' conclusion that
California law provides adequate remedies for return of their property .... Rather, they
contend the City deprived them of due process by failing to provide them notice of their
remedies and the factual information necessary to invoke the remedies under California
law.
City of West Covina v. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. 678, 681 (1999). The plaintiffs in Gete
sought notice of the statute under which their cars were seized, not notice of the
remedy for retrieving their cars. Gete, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11806, at *9.
"' Gete, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11806, at *14-*15.
"'Id. at *15-*16.
See id. at *15.
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In McKenzie v. City of Chicago,194 the court denied the plain-
tiffs' motion for summary judgment on their claim that the City
of Chicago's notification process for a demolition program was
inadequate because it neither informed them of the City's
demolition determination, nor notified them of the procedures
available to obtain a pre-deprivation hearing.195 The notice pro-
vided by the City cited a statute containing the information
needed to challenge a municipality's deprivation of property.
196
The plaintiffs argued that the notice was inadequate and did
not provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard because the
statute cited merely stated that "a person 'objecting to the pro-
posed actions of the [City] may file his or her objection in an
appropriate form in a court of competent jurisdiction.", 197 The
defendants relied on Perkins for the proposition that a notice
which cites a statute is per se constitutional. 19 After precluding
summary judgment based on the existence of issues of material
fact, the court distinguished Perkins on the ground that it in-
volved a challenge to post-deprivation remedies for property le-
gally seized pursuant to a search warrant.'9 The court also
noted that even though Perkins supports the notion of statutory
notice, the statute in McKenzie may be deemed inadequate for
failing to provide a meaningful pre-deprivation hearing.
C. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT GOVERNS NOTICES OF SEIZURE
The majority opinion asserted, in dicta, that the Due Proc-
ess Clause governs the execution of a criminal search warrant by
requiring law enforcement officers to take reasonable steps to
give notice that property has been seized."' In his concurring
opinion, Justice Thomas refused to endorse the majority's asser-
tion based on what he referred to as "an ahistorical reliance on
"' No. 97C-284, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9084 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 1999).
" Id. at *7. After stating the requirements for summary judgment under FED. .
COV. P. 56(c), namely that there must no genuine issue of material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court found that genuine
issues of material fact existed as to the adequacy of notice claim. Id. at *5-*6.
Id. at *7.
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procedural due process as the source of the "notice of seizure"
requirement.2
The majority's suggestion represents an unwarranted and
careless expansion of due process principles into an area his-
torically governed by the Fourth Amendment.203 According to a
majority of the Supreme Court in Gerstein, the Fourth Amend-
ment is specifically suited to governing the criminal justice sys-
tem, and implicitly contains a due process requirement, which
abrogates the need for reliance on the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment in particular criminal cases.'" The
majority in Gerstein noted that the Fourth Amendment was tai-
lored explicitly for the criminal justice system, and that the bal-
ance it strikes between individual and public interests defines
the "process that is due" for seizures of people or property in
205criminal cases.
Fourth Amendment law has traditionally limited govern-
ment evidence gathering in order to guard individual privacy. °6
Two eighteenth century cases, Entick v. Carrington,27 and Wilkes
v. Wood,05 heavily influenced the development of the Fourth




Id. at 685 (Thomas,J, concurring).
" See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (1975). The Fourth Amendment
provides in pertinent part: "The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
..."U.S  CONsT. amend. IV.
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125, 126 n.27.
20 Id.
WilliamJ. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE LJ. 393,
395 (1995).
'07 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765).
98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763).
See id. at 396-97. Stuntz noted that these cases share two common themes:
First and foremost, both decisions emphasize the importance of the privacy interest in
homes and papers. This was the main focus of [the] opinion in Entick, and though it was
less critical to Wilkes's success, the quoted portion of Pratt's jury instruction plainly strikes
the privacy chord. This interest was, to be sure, wrapped up with Entick's and Wilkes's
property interests-the word "property" appears more often than "privacy" in these cases..
Second, both decisions express concern with official discretion, a concern reflected par-
ticularly in Pratt's rejection of the general warrant used against Wilkes. The set of cases
arising out of The North Briton No. 45 episode came to stand for the proposition that such
warrants are invalid-a proposition later explicitly enshrined in the Fourth Amendment-
and that arrests must be grounded in some cause to suspect the arrestee personally of a
crime. Together, these concerns seem to capture the essence of the Fourth Amendment,
at least from the perspective of the men who wrote and ratified it.
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The respective plaintiffs were authors of political pamphlets
critical of the King's ministers.210 Consequently, both suffered
the search of their homes and the seizure of all their books and
papers, and both sued the officials who carried out the searches
and won-collecting substantial damages.2 1' The respective
courts emphasized the importance of limiting the government's
power to search for and seize private papers in private homes.212
The courts also admonished the officers for not leaving an in-
ventory of the property seized.21 ' This admonition suggests that
at common law the proper execution of a search warrant re-
quired officers to provide the property owners with an inventory
of the property seized.1 4 The common law concern for institut-
ing procedural constraints against the government is evinced in
the Fourth Amendment's requirement that warrants must "par-
ticularly [describe] the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
215
The Fourth Amendment's requirement that warrants be
specific is based on the common law notion that general war-
rants are unreasonable.1 6 The Amendment's prohibition of
general warrants was deemed to be part of a larger scheme to
categorically extinguish general searches.217 The notion that
general warrants are unreasonable represents the relationship
between the concept of unreasonableness in the first clause of
the Amendment and the warrant requirements dictated in the
Id at 399-400.
210 See ida at 397.
21 See id.
212 See id.
21, See Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1067 (C.P. 1765) ("The same law
which has with so much circumspection guarded the case of stolen goods from mis-
chief, would likewise in this case protect the subject, by adding proper checks;...
would require him to take an exact inventory, and deliver a copy.... Want of [these
safeguards] is an undeniable argument against the legality of the thing."); Wilkes v.
Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 499 (KB. 1763) ("As to the proof of what papers were taken
away, the plaintiff could have no account of them; and those who were unable to have
given an account.., have produced none.").
See TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONsTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 82 (1969).
,'U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
216 See Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1707, 1713 (1996). The specific warrant clause "is a direct outgrowth of a multi-
staged, centuries-long rebellion against general warrants by British intellectuals that
inspired all other facets of the amendment." Id. at 1714.
"' Id. at 1724.
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second clause.28 The original meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment dictates that "specific warrants [are] mandatory and [are]
intended to be the conventional method for search and sei-
zure."219 Specific warrants came into prominence precisely be-
cause they protected citizens' rights against unreasonable
methods.
22
In the early twentieth century, the Fourth Amendment
seemed to lose its momentum in regulating police power, and
due process became the focus of the law of criminal proce-
dure. The rise of police forces in the mid-1900s led courts to
focus on police coercion and violence rather than proper sei-
zure procedures:
Police officers do notjust look for evidence; they force people to do
things. The force may be gentle or subtle, or it may be harsh, even bru-
tal. By the mid-twentieth century, a growing body of due process case law
reflected courts' concern with this danger. Thus, by about 1950, Fourth
and Fifth Amendment law was almost an empty shell, while due process
cases concerned with regulating police coercion seemed about to take
over the law of criminal procedure.
However, this takeover did not occur. 3 The due process
cases became less prevalent in the field of criminal procedure,
and the Fourth Amendment once again became the chief vehi-
cle for regulating the police:
The main point of [this body] of law is to regulate the police. This
regulation is no small affair; modem Fourth and Fifth Amendment law
governs the day-to-day decisions about how police make arrests and
gather evidence and question suspects. It has gone from being nearly ir-
relevant to ordinary criminal investigation to dominating ordinary
criminal investigation.... In the 1960s, the courts' concern with shield-
ing evidence from the government's prying eyes came to dominate the
law of police investigation of crime.... The Fourth Amendment and
21R See id. at 1713. See also supra note 82 for the text of the Fourth Amendment.
2) Cloud, supra note 216, at 1713. Although the specific warrant originated in Eng-
land, its development continued in North America between 1755 and 1789. Id at
1714. During the years after the American Revolution, "general warrants and
searches were rejected and specific warrants and searches were adopted in the laws of
many of the original states." Id.
, Id. at 1730.
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Fifth Amendment lire] now the primary bodies of law that regulate day-
to-day police work.
Therefore, the Fourth Amendment exclusively governs the
execution of search warrants, which includes the notice that
property has been seized.ss
The Ninth Circuit recently emphasized the importance of a
warrant's notice function in United States v. Gantt.226  In Gantt,
the court held that Rule 41 (d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Proceduiie, 227 absent exigent circumstances, requires service of
the warrant at the outset of the search on persons present at the
search of their premises .228 The court pointed out that in addi-
tion to its "assurance" function,2  the particularized warrant re-
quirement is also intended to notify the person subject to the
search of the items that the officers are entitled to seize.230 It
also bears mentioning that Rule 41 (d) specifically requires offi-
cers to provide to the person present or leave behind a list of
See, e.g., id.
194 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1999), amending and superseding 179 F.3d 782 (9th Cir.
1999).
'" Section 41(d) provides in pertinent part:
the officer taking property under the warrant shall give to the person from whom or from
whose premises the property was taken a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property
taken or shall leave the copy and receipt at the place from which the propertywas taken ...
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d).
' Gantt, 194 F.3d at 990. The court rejected the government's argument that leav-
ing the warrant behind after the search satisfies Rule 41(d) when the person is pres-
ent at the outset of the search. Id. The court further stated, "showing Gantt the face
of the warrant without Attachment A certainly did not satisfy Rule 41 (d). Without At-
tachment A, the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement
and for purposes of Rule 41(d) was not a valid warrant. "Id. at 990 n.7.
' The court cited United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977), for the proposi-
tion that an essential function of the warrant is to "assure[ ] the individual whose
property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his
need to search, and the limits of his power to search." Gantt, 194 F.3d at 990.
L" Gantt, 194 F.3d at 991. The court further stated:
[i]f a person is present at the search of her premises, agents are faithful to the "assurance"
and "notice" functions of the wan-ant only if they serve the warrant at the outset of the
search. Awarrant served after the search is completed cannot timely "provide the property
owner with sufficient information to reassure him of the entry's legality."
Id. (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 508 (1978)).
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the property taken.23' Furthermore, the principles set forth in
the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment, gov-
232ern Rule 41 (d) and its analogous state statutes.
Given its history, the requirement of notice of property sei-
zure in criminal investigations is more appropriately based on
Fourth Amendment principles, rather than on the principles
embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as the Perkins majority suggests.f5 Furthermore,
couching the "notice of seizure" requirement in the Fourth
Amendment prevents the expansion of procedural due process
principles into unwarranted areas, which preserves the integrity
of the due process doctrine.M
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court properly concluded that the Due Proc-
ess Clause does not require law enforcement agents to notify
property owners of post-deprivation remedies for the return of
property seized pursuant to a search warrant. The Court based
its decision on (1) the well-established statutory notice rule; (2)
the absence of support in Supreme Court precedent for a rem-
edy notification requirement in the post-deprivation context;
and (3) the lack of support for a remedy notification require-
ment in well-established federal and state rules of criminal pro-
cedure.
"' See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d) ("[O]fficer[s] ... shall [provide] ... a copy of the
warrant and a receipt of the property taken.... .") (emphasis added).
' See generally Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 508 (1978) ("[A] major function of
the warrant is to provide the property owner with sufficient information to reassure
him of the entry's legality."); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566
(1976) ("[W]ithout a warrant... the occupant has... no way of knowing the lawful
limits of the inspector's power to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspec-
tor himself is acting under proper authorization.") (quoting Camara v. Municipal Ct.,
387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967)); Gantt, 194 F.3d at 990 ("Rule 41(d) must be interpreted in
the light of the important policies underlying the [Fourth Amendment's] warrant re-
quirement-to provide the property owner assurance and notice during the
search.").
" See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 ("The Fourth Amendment was tai-
lored explicitly for the criminal justice system, and its balance between individual and
public interests always has been thought to define the 'process that is due' for sei-
zures of property in criminal cases."). See also Stuntz, supra note 206, at 434.
' Cf. Fallon, supra note 8, at 309 ("[T]he Supreme Court's recurrent efforts to
shape due process law to promote policy ends have taken a toll on doctrinal integ-
rity.").
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Furthermore, the Court's decision will not have an adverse
impact on future property deprivation cases if it is properly lim-
ited to seizures similar to those in Perkins. However, the major-
ity should have based its "notice of seizure" requirement,
discussed in dicta, on the principles espoused by the Fourth
Amendment's requirement for specific warrants and its guaran-
tee against unreasonable seizures, rather than on the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nyika Prendergast
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